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INTRODUCTION

The five employment law cases decided by the Supreme
· Professor of Law, University of Richmond.
*' Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center
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Court during the October 1999 Term bring to nineteen the
total number of significant employment law cases decided by
the Court during the last three terms.' The October 1997
Term cases were marked by primary focus on employer
liability, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' for
sexual harassment by supervisors.' Primary focus during the
1998 Term was on disability discrimination under the
4
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and on the
constitutionality of actions brought by private parties against
states under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),' in light of
the Eleventh Amendment0 sovereign immunity of the states.'
An overview of the 1997 and 1998 Term employment law
cases is provided in Section II of this article.
The most important of the October 1999 Term
employment law cases focused on the pretext-plus doctrine in
employment discrimi-nation law and standards for ruling on
motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of

1. The six 1997 Term cases, discussed infra in Section II, are Oubre v. Entergy
Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 {1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Seivs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998); Gelssal v. Moore Medical Corp., 524 U.S. 74 (1998); Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998);
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). The eight 1998 Tenn cases,
also discussed infra in Section II, are Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525
U.S. 70 (1998); Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999);
West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999); Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S.
526 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Albertson's,' Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.
555 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). The five 1999 Term cases,
discussed infra in Sections III - VII, are Kimel v. State of Florida Bd. of Regents, 120
S. Ct. 631 (2000); Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000); Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000); Pegram v. Herdrlch, 120 S.
Ct. 2143 (2000); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 120 S. Ct.
2180 (2000).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l to 2000e-l 7 (1994).
3. An excellent analysis of employment law cases from the October 1997 Term
is contained in Robert Belton, Employment Law: A Review of the 1997 Tenn Decisions
of the Supreme Court, 2 EMPLOYEE Rrs. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 267 ( 1998).
4. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101·12213 (1994).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
6. The Eleventh Amendment to the U. S. Constitution provides: "The Judicial
Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of

another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend.
XI.

7. An excellent analysis of employment law cases from the October 1998 Term
is contained in Robert Belton, The Employment Law Decisions of the 1998-99 Tenn of
the Supreme Court: a Review, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'y J. 183 (1999).
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law.' The Court also considered the impact of Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity of the states on private law
suits brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment
10
Act (ADEA)" against state government employers, forced use
11
of FLSA compensatory time by public employees, liability of
HMOs under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act
13
(ERISA) 12 for mixed eligibility and treatment decisions, and
14
ERISA actions against nonfiduciaries.
If one takes a three year view of the nineteen employment
law cases, from the perspective of victories for employee
plaintiffs versus victories for employer defendants, the results
are mixed, but generally favor employees. Beneath the
surface, one sees three voting patterns. First, two members
of the Court, Justices Scalia and Thomas, usually joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, consistently vote in favor of
employer interests unless they are constrained by Supreme
Court precedent or controlling statutory language. Four
members of the Court, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter,
and Stevens, generally support employees, although
deviations from this pattern occur based upon the specifics of
individual cases. The remaining two Justices, Kennedy and
O'Connor, are unpredictable in their voting patterns. Alone,
or in combination with each other, they determined
the
15
outcome in six of the nineteen employment law cases.
II. OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES FROM THE 1997 AND
1998TERMS

The three most significant employment law cases from
See Reeves, discused infra Section III.
29 u.s.c. §§ 621-34 (1994).
See Kimel, discussed infra Section IV.
See Christensen, discussed infra Section V.
29 u.s.c. §§ 1001-1467 (1994).
See Pegram, discussed infra Section VI.
See Hanis, discussed infra Section VII.
Three October 1999 Term
nonemployment law cases, with employment law impact, are discussed in Section
VIII. The cases are Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000) (RICO not violated by
termination of employment in retaliation for reporting RICO violations); Cortez Byrd
Chips, Inc. V. Bill Harbert Construction Co., 120 S.Ct. 1331 (2000) (Federal
Arbitration Act venue issues); and Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United
States ex-rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858 {2000} (qui tam actions by state employees
against state agencies).
15. Oubre, Bragdon, West, Kolstad, Alden, and Kimel.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

180

EMPWYEE RIGHTS AND EMPWYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 4: 177

the 1997 Term dealt with Title VII challenges to sexual
harassment. The frrst two, Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth16 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 17 established
standards for determining if employers are vicariously liable
for sexual harassment by supervisors. The Court held that if
a "tangible employment action" 18 is taken (such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment), there will be
vicarious liability. If no tangible employment action is taken,
an employer may avoid vicarious liability by proving that it
acted reasonably "to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior," 19 and by proving that "the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise .... "20
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented from the employeeprotective approach of the majority in Ellerth and Faragher. If
no tangible employment action is taken against the employee,
these two justices would impose liability only when an
employer is negligent. Justice Thomas expressed this view as
follows: "[A]bsent an adverse employment consequence, an
employer cannot be held vicariously liable if a supervisor
creates a hostile work environment. "21
In the third sexual harassment case, Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 22 Justice Scalia, writing for
a unanimous Court, concluded that same-sex sexual
harassment violates Title VII. Justice Scalia relied upon
Supreme Court precedent holding that there may be unlawful
discrimination even if a perpetrator is of the same race or
gender as the victim." In Oncale, Justice Scalia wrote: "If our
precedents leave any doubt on the question, we hold today
that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of
discrimination 'because of . . . sex' merely because the
16. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
17. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
18. Burlington. 524 U.S. at 744.
19. Id. at 747.
20. Id. at 765.
21. Faragher. 524 U.S. at 810.
22. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
23. Justice Scalia cited Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara
County. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). with respect to sex. and Castaneda v. Partida. 430 U.S.
482 {1977), with respect to race.
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plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting
24
on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex. "
Another significant case from the 1997 Term provided
encouragement for those who seek expansive protection for
disabled workers under the ADA. In Bragdon v. Abbott,"
Justice Kennedy controlled the outcome by joining the
Breyer-Ginsburg-Souter-Stevens group. The Court held that
HN infection is a disability under the ADA because it causes
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
26
one of the major life activities of [an] individual. " The Court
discussed attacks by HN on immune and lymphatic systems,
resulting in physical impairments that substantially limit.
among other things, a person's major life activitiy of
reproduction. The Court stated: "Testimony from [Sidney
Abbott] that her HN infection controlled her decision not to
have a child is unchallenged." 27 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and O'Connor, dissented
and concluded that Sidney Abbott "failed to demonstrate that
any of her major life activities were substantially limited by
2
her HN infection." '
The two remaining employment law cases from the 1997
Term reflect the pattern in which Justices Scalia and
Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, favor employers
when this does not require rejection of clear statutory text or
Supreme Court precedent. In the first of these cases, Geissa[
v. Moore Medical Corp., 2 ' Justice Souter, writing for a
unanimous Court, interpreted a portion of the Consolidated
30
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), which
amended ERISA. Justice Souter concluded that the "plain
meaning" 31 of the text required that a former employee retain
his or her right to continued medical coverage under the
former employer's medical insurance plan, even if the former
24. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
25. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). The quoted text ls one of three ADA definitions
of disability. The other two are having "a record of such an impairment" and "being
regarded as having such impairment." Id.
27. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
28. Id. at 661 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
29. 524 U.S. 74 (1998).
30. 29 u.s.c. §§ 1161-68 (1994).
31. Geissal, 524 U.S. at 82.
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employee was covered under another medical insurance plan
at the time the employment relationship ended. Most lower
courts had held that coverage under another plan at the time
employment terminated precluded a right to continue under
2
the employer's plan, unless there was a "significant gap"' in
coverage between the employer's plan and the other plan."
Justice Souter's opinion for the Court considered the
complicated· factors involved in determining if there is a
significant gap in coverage, and concluded that "the required
judgment is so far unsuitable for courts that we would expect
a clear mandate before inferring that Congress meant to foist
it on the judiciary." 34 Because of this policy concern and the
plain text of COBRA, all members of the Court joined Justice
Souter's opinion.
The remaining case from the 1997 Term, Oubre v. Entergy
Operations, Inc., 35 also protected statutory rights of
employees. A majority of six, consisting of Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor, strictly applied statutory requirements for
waiver and release of ADEA rights. These requirements were
added to the ADEA in 1990 by the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act (OWBPA). 36 They were designed to insure that
waivers and releases of ADEA rights by employees are
knowing and voluntary. The majority concluded that an
employee need not "tender back" the consideration received
for a waiver and release of ADEA claims, as a precondition to
bringing suit under the ADEA. At the same time, because it
might be unjust for a plaintiff to retain the original
consideration and also receive a remedy in the ADEA action,
the majority noted that the employer may have "claims for
37
restitution, recoupment, or setoff against the employee."
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented, with Chief Justice
32. Id. at 85.
33. See, e.g., National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Atlanta,
Inc .. 929 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991); Brock v. Prirnedlca, Inc., 904 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.
1990); but see Lutheran Hosp. of Indiana, Inc. v. Business Men's Assurance Co., 51
F.3d 1308 (7th Cir. 1995).
34. Geissal, 524 U.S. at 87.
35. 522 U.S. 422 (1998).
36. Pub. L. No. 101-433, Title II, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
621-34) (1994)).
37. Oubre, 522 U.S. at 428.
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Rehnquist joining the dissent of Justice Thomas. They would
have required, "as a condition precedent to suit, that a
plaintiff return the consideration received in exchange for a
release .... "38 The dissent would have limited the ability of
many plaintiffs to bring suit for ADEA violations because
these plaintiffs, 'prior to bringing suit, already would have
spent that which they received in return for their waiver and
release of ADEA claims.3°
The Court interpreted the ADA in three interrelated cases
during the 1998 Term, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. .4°
41
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., and Albertson's, Inc., v.
Kirkingburg.'2 The Court held that a determination that an
individual is disabled under the ADA requires an
individualized determination of the extent to which a
particular physical impairment limits a major life activity of
that individual." It further held that corrective or mitigating
measures must be considered in determining if there is a
substantial limitation of a major life activity of an individual.
Six members of the Court, including Justices Ginsburg and
Souter, joined the opinion of Justice O'Connor in Sutton. The
case involved twin sisters with severe myopia who were
denied global pilot positions with United Air Lines, even
though their corrected vision was 20/20.
The Court
concluded that they were not disabled under the ADA
because they were not substantially limited in a major life
activity. Their ability to see was not substantially limited
because their vision was corrected. They also were not
limited in the major life activity of working because, although
disqualified by their vision from being global pilots, they
could hold other pilot positions.
In Murphy, a truck mechanic was fired by UPS because of
medically controlled high blood pressure. As in Sutton, there
was a physical impairment, but not one that substantially
38. Id. at 437 {Thomas, J., dissenting).
39. On December 11, 2000, the EEOC published a rule based on Oubre which
dealt with the tender back issue and related OWBPA waiver and release issues.
Waivers of Rights and Claims: Tender Back of Consideration, 65 Fed. Reg. 77437
(2000) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1625) (effective Jan. 10, 2001).
40.
41.
42.
43.

527 U.S. 471 (1999).
527 U.S. 516 (1999).
527 U.S. 555 (1999).
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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limited a major life activity. Medication permitted Murphy to
function normally in his major life activities, and he was not
substantially limited in the major life activity of working
because, although disqualified from mechanic positions that
required driving the trucks, Murphy could perform other
mechanic jobs.
In Albertson's, a truck driver was fired because he
suffered from amblyopia, which causes monocular vision.
The Court held that mitigating measures must be taken into
account in determining if he was disabled under the ADA,
and an individualized determination must be made to
determine if his medical condition substantially limits one of
his major life activities. These mitigating measures included
changes within the individual's own body to compensate for
the impairment.
The majority opinions by Justice O'Connor in Sutton and
Murphy, and by Justice Souter in Albertson's, leave the
impression that the justices made a genuine attempt to
discern the actual intent of Congress. In a concurring
opinion in Sutton, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the intent
of Congress was to "restrict the ADA's coverage to a confined,
44
and historically disadvantaged class." Because of this, she
agreed that the ADA "does not reach the legions of people
with correctable disabilities.'"'
The members of the Court agreed in their reasoning and
result in another case involving the ADA, Cleveland v. Policy
6
Management Systems Corp.4 Cleveland involved the defense
of judicial estoppel,
which prevents "a party from
contradicting previous declarations made during the same or
a later proceeding if the change in position would adversely
47
affect the proceeding or constitute a fraud on the court. "
The doctrine was applied by some federal courts in cases in
which a plaintiff applied for Social Security Disability
48
Insurance ("SSDI") benefits under the Social Security Act, as
a disabled person unable to work, and subsequently filed an
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 494.
526 U.S. 795 (1999).
BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY517 (7th ed. 1999).
42 U.S.C. § 423 (1994 & Supp. !I 1996).
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ADA action claiming to be a disabled person able to perform
the essential functions of a job. The apparent inconsistency
between these two positions led many lower courts to dismiss
the ADA actions.
The Court's unanimous opinion in
Cleveland, written by Justice Breyer, relied upon the
differences in the definitions of disability under the Social
Security Act and the ADA. Reasonable accommodation is not
taken into consideration under the Social Security Act in
determining if an individual is able to work. The Court
concluded that judicial estoppel does not apply in this
situation, although a plaintiff who claims to be disabled for
SSDI purposes and subsequently files an ADA action "cannot
simply ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of
the earlier SSDI total disability claim. Rather, she must
49
proffer a sufficient explanation."
The Court thus was
unanimous in a decision that gave a benefit both to
employers and employees, and was based upon a straightforward reading of statutory text.
The Court also was unanimous in a case involving
mandatory arbitration of employment
disputes, Wright
50
v.Universal Maritime Service Corp.
Wright involved a
mandatory arbitration clause contained in a collective
bargaining agreement. The employer sought to force Wright
to submit his ADA claim to binding arbitration rather than
proceed in federal court. The Court's decision focused on the
power of a union to bargain away its members' right to a
judicial forum for resolution of ADA claims (and other
statutory claims). In a tantalizing opinion for the Court, that
ultimately left more unresolved than resolved,
Justice Scalia
51
established a "clear and unmistakable" waiver standard for
a "union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to a52
judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination."
The next to last sentence in the opinion was as follows: "We
do not reach the question whether such a waiver would be
enforceable." 53 The Scalia-Thomas-Rehnquist group may
have declined to use this case as an opportunity to advocate
49.
50.
51.
52.

Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806.

525 U.S. 70 (1998).
Jd. at 80.
Id.
53. Id. at 82.

EMPWYEE RIGHTS AND EMPWYMENT POUCY JOURNAL

186

[Vol. 4: 177

support for binding arbitration of employment disputes
because of a reluctance to overrule existing Supreme Court
precedent. A decision authorizing clear and unmistakable
waivers by a union of its members' rights to a judicial forum
for statutory employment claims would conflict, at least in
part, with the Court's 1974 decision in Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co. 54 In Alexander, the Court considered a provision
in a collective · bargaining agreement that required union
members to submit disputes to binding arbitration. The
Court held that "there can be no prospective waiver of an
55
employee's rights under Title VII. "
The importance of the binding arbitration issues raised
by Wright warrants an update on the post-Wright decisions by
lower federal courts. The Fourth Circuit, the only circuit to
allow waivers before Wright, decided several cases indicating
what it would recognize as a waiver. In Carson v. Giant Food,
Inc.,56 the Fourth Circuit read Wright as establishing two
methods of waiver that would meet the requisite standard.
First, the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause
could provide specifically that employees agree to arbitrate all
federal claims arising out of employment. Alternatively,
where the arbitration clause applies to all disputes, or all
disputes concerning the interpretation of the agreement, the
statutory discrimination laws must be incorporated in the
collective bargaining agreement in order for there to be a
waiver. 57 A general anti-discrimination r~quirement
will not
9
suffice. 58 In Brown v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc,5 the Fourth
Circuit expanded upon Carson and held that contractual
language which "may parallel, or even parrot, the language of
60
federal anti-discrimination statutes," does not explicitly
incorporate the statutes into the agreement. The court
explained, "There is a significant difference, and we believe a
legally dispositive one, between an agreement not to commit
discriminatory acts that are prohibited by law and an
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Id at 51.
175 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 331-32.
Id. at 332.
183 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 322.
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agreement to incorporate, in toto, the
antidiscrimination
61
statutes that prohibit those acts."
Courts in other
jurisdictions have followed Carson and, with a few exceptions,
have declined to find waivers of the right to litigate in a
judicial forum.6 2 The Wright waiver standard
has been
63
applied to state· discrimination law claimS and constitutional
4

claims.6
One district court in the Fourth Circuit has found a
waiver based on Carson and Brown.6' While the language of
the agreement is not quoted in the case, the court described
the language as containing an agreement "not to discriminate
against any employee because of gender and to abide by Title
6
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'" The court also wrote:
"Section XX of the CBA requires that any grievance against
Defendant for discrimination must be submitted to
arbitration." 67 The case was not appealed and it is difficult to
tell from the court's description of the language whether it
met either of the requirements articulated in Carson. A
recent decision from the Eastern District of New York gave
preclusive effect to an arbitrator's decision denying a sexual
harassment grievance, thereby granting summary judgment
on the plaintiffs' Title VII and state law claims.6' The court
6L
62. Id.
See, e.g.. Rogers v. New York Univ .• 220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
union waivers of individual rights are unenforceable, but even if they are enforceable
after Wright, there is no waiver where there is no specific incorporation of the
statute, by name or citation, and no contractual commitment to comply with the
statute.); Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co .. 215 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding no
waiver where the collective bargaining agreement did not mention the statute and
the employee's grievance alleging discrimination did not waive the right to litigate in
a judicial forum. even though the arbitrator and the employee discussed the statute);
Quint v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co .. J 72 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding no waiver where
there was no contractual mention of the statute).
63. See Vasquez v. Superior Court. 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, found a waiver of a state
statutory claim where the arbitration clause covered "claims arising out of or under
this {collective bargaining agreement} or the employee's emploYJilent, including but
not limited to any EEOC, ADA, ADEA or other statutory claims ... ."Torres v. Four
Seasons Hotel, 715 N.Y.S. 2d 28, 29 (App. Div. 2000).
64. See Schumacher v. Souderton Area Sch. Dist., 163 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2461
(E.D. Pa. 2000).
65. See Safrit v. Cone Mills. 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2974 (M.D.N.C. 1999).
66. Id. at 2975.
67.
68. Id.
Clarke v. UFJ, Inc .. 164 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2388 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). Since the
decision, however, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its earlier decision that union
waivers of employee rights to litigate statutory claims are unenforceable. Rogers v.
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concluded that there was a clear and unmistakable
agreement to arbitrate statutory claims based on a
contractual commitment to end sexual harassment, which
included a definition drawn in part from Supreme Court Title
VII cases and language stating that grievances under the
sexual harassment clause will be handled with speed and
confidentiality. In contrast to other courts, the New York
court did not require express incorporation of the statute, but
found a waiver based upon the use of language from cases
interpreting the statute.
During the 1998 Term, in Alden v. Maine.6" the Court
applied the Eleventh Amendment and related principles of
sovereign immunity to block enforcement of the overtime
compensation provisions of the FLSA against state agencies
through private law suits.
Although the Eleventh
Amendment previously was held only to block private law
suits brought against states in federal court, in Alden the
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment, and related state
sovereign immunity principles, also shield an unconsenting
state from being sued in state court. The decision in Alden
demonstrates the traditional voting patterns of the justices in
employment law cases. A majority of five was formed when
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens were in dissent. Alden and
other Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity cases
led to the 1999 Term decision in Kimel v. State of Florida
Board of Regents,'0 in which the ADEA was held to be
unenforceable against state agency employers through private
actions by state employees in federal court.
Kimel is
discussed in Section N.
The remaining two employment cases from the 1998
71
Term interpreted the text of Title VII. In West v. Gibson, the
Court first considered language added to Title VII in 1972
that authorizes the EEOC to use an administrative procedure
to provide "appropriate remedies" for employment
New York Univ., 220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000).
69. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
70. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
71. 527 U.S. 212 (1999).
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discrimination against federal government employees." The
Court then considered the Compensatory Damages
Amendment Act of 1991, 73 which provided for compensatory
damage awards for victims of intentional employment
discrimination, including victims who are employees of the
federal government. The Court interpretated both statutes
and concluded that the EEOC has power to award
compensatory damages to federal government employees.
Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court was joined by Justices
Ginsburg, O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens, with the
participation of Justice O'Connor making this the majority
view. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas were in dissent.
The Court also interpreted the text of Title VII in Kolstad
v. American Dental Association, 74 which involved the standard
to be used for awards of punitive damages under Title VII, as
amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
The statutory
language provides for an award of punitive damages if an
employer acts "with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights"" of an employee. Some lower
courts construed this language to mean that egregious
lnisconduct is required. The opinion for the Court by Justice
O'Connor did not accept this stringent test for awards of
punitive damages, and held that "[t]he terms 'malice' or
'reckless indifference' pertain to the employer's knowledge
that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its
awareness that it is engaging in discrilnination." 76 This
portion of her opinion, supportive of employees, was joined by
seven members of the Court, with dissents by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas who preferred an eggregious
lnisconduct standard. Justice O'Connor then dramatically
lilnited employer vicarious liability for punitive damages on a
basis that was not briefed by the parties. Joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and
Thomas, she wrote, "Recognizing Title VII as an effort to
promote prevention as well as remediation ... we agree that
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

42 USC§ 2000e-16[bl(l994).
42 U.S.C. § 19811(a)(l)[l994).
527 U.S. 526 (1999).
42 U.S.C. § 1981a[bl(I) (1994).
Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535.
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an employer may not be vicariously liable for the
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents
where these decisions are contrary to the employer's 'good77
faith efforts to comply with Title VII."' Justice Stevens, joined
by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter, dissented from the
failure of the Court to remand the case for trial on the
punitive damages issue. They wrote, "The absence ofbriefmg
or meaningful argument by the parties makes this Court's
gratuitous decision to volunteer an opinion on this nonissue
particularly ill advised." 78 This overview of the 1997 and 1998
Term employment law cases provides context for a review of
the 1999 Term decisions.
III. PRETEXT-PLUS DOCTRINE, MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW - Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.

Employees were the victors in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc. 79 The decision rejected pretext-plus
doctrine and limited the ability of federal judges to grant
motions for summary judgment and motions for judgment as
a matter of law in employment discrimination cases.
The pretext-plus portion of the Court's decision confirms
the continuing validity of three earlier Supreme Court
decisions that established a workable method for proving
individual disparate treatment cases through the use of
circumstantial evidence.8° The first of these cases, McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green. 81 held that a plaintiff in a racial
77. Id. at 545.
78. Id. at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000).
80. The three cases, McDonnell Douglas Corp.v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973);
Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 {1981); and St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 {1993), were based upon Title VII, whereas Reeves
is an ADEA case. The parties in Reeves did not dispute the applicability of the
holdings of the three cases to the ADEA and the Court "assume[d], arguendo, that
the McDonnell Douglas framework is fully applicable ... " 120 S.Ct. at 2105. Lower
courts in all circuits have applied McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and Hicks to ADEA
cases, and the Supreme Court earlier "assumeldl" that McDonnell Douglas applies to
ADEA cases. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311
(1996). In O'Connor, the Court reviewed a decision of the Fourth Circuit that applied
McDonnell Douglas to an ADEA action and listed cases from the other eleven circuits
in which McDonnell Douglas had been applied in ADEA cases. Id. at 309 n2.
81. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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discrimination Title VII action may establish a prima facie
case
by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualification."

The Court's opinion also provided a basis for applying the
basic approach of McDonnell Douglas, with appropriate
variations, to individual disparate treatment claims involving
other aspects of the employment process, such as promotions
and terminations, 83 and other categories of discrimination
covered by Title VII, such as national origin and gender.••
Establishment of a· prima facie case shifts to the
defendant employer a burden "to articulate some legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 85 The
plaintiff then must "be afforded a fair opportunity to show
that the [defendant's] stated reason for [the plaintiffs]
rejection was in fact pretext." 86
87
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
the Court clarified two aspects of McDonnell-Douglas. First,
the Court made it clear that the defendant employer's burden
is one of production, not persuasion. The Court explained
this as follows:
The burden that shifts to the defendant ... is to rebut the
presumption of discrimination ... The defendant need not
persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proferred reasons.
It is sufficient if the defendant's
evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it
82. Id. at 802.
83. See id. at 802 n.13 (''The facts will vary in Title VII cases, and the
specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not

necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.").
84. Title VII provides:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
85. McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at802.
86. Id. at 804.
87. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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discrimillated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the
defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction
of admissible
evidence, the reason for the plaintiffs
88
rejection.
The second part of McDonnell Douglas that was clarified
by Burdine relates to proof of pretext by the plaintiff. The

Court held that a plaintiff can demonstrate pretext in either
of two ways, "either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer's proferred
explanation is unworthy of credence." 89
The Burdine pretext stage was the focus of attention in St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. 90
In Hicks, the Court
emphasized that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains
on the plaintiff at all times, 91 and that the prima facie case "is
no longer relevant" 92 and "simply drops out of the picture,"93
once the defendant has met its burden of production. The
Court then focused on that portion of Burdine that held that
pretext can be proven by "showing the employer's proferred
explanation is unworthy of credence." 94 Justice Scalia's
opinion in Hicks held that this proof of pretext does not
"[compel) judgment for the plaintiff' 95 because "nothing in law
would permit us to substitute for the required fmding that
the employer's action was the product of unlawful
discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) fmding
that the employer's explanation of its action was not
believable. "95 Instead, "the trier of fact proceeds to decide the
ultimate question: whether plaintiff has proven 'that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against [him)' because
of his race ... "97 This does not mean, however, that proof of
pretext is never sufficient, by itself, to prove discrimination,
nor does it mean that the evidence used to create a prima
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 254-55 {citation and footnote omitted}.

Id. at 256.
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Id. at 507.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 517, quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
Id. at 514-15.
Id. at 511, quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
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facie case and prove pretext is irrelevant.

Justice Scalia

wrote:

The factfmder·s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a
suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of
the prirr\a facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proferred
reasons will permit the trier of fact
to infer the ultimate fact
98
of intentional discrimination ....

Justice Scalia's pretext discussion in Hicks gave rise to
the pretext-plus doctrine. It also led to Reeves, and the
pretext-plus doctrine's demise.
The pretext-plus doctrine, as applied by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Reeves and by some federal courts in
other cases,'' provides that a prtma facie case plus proof of
pretext alone do not permit a judgment for the plaintiff.
Instead, additional evidence of intentional discrimination is
required. For example, in Reeves the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a lower court judgment for the plaintiff
because the additional evidence, beyond that which
established the prima facie case and proved pretext, was
insufficient in the appellate court's view to support a
judgment for the plaintiff. 100 Proof of pretext plus other
credible evidence was required. Justice O'Connor described
the lower court's error as follows: "[B]ecause a prima facie
case and sufficient evidence to reject the employer's
explanation may permit a finding of liability, the Court of
Appeals erred in proceeding from the premise that a plaintiff
must always introduce additional, independent evidence of
101

discrimination."
Roger Reeves was terminated at the age of fifty-seven
after forty years of employment by Sanderson Plumbing
Products. In his ADEA action, he established a prima facie
case by proving: (1) he was in the ADEA protected class of
98. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
99. See, e.g., Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ .. 193 F.3d 219, 230 (4th Cir. 1999)
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1243 (2000); Gillins v. Berkeley Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 148
F.3d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 1998); Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp .. 119 F.3d 330, 337
(5th Cir. 1997); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co .. 6 F.3d 836, 842-43 (1st Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018 (1994).
100. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 693 (5th Cir.
1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
101. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2109.
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persons forty years of age or older, (2) he was qualified for his
manufacturtng supervisor position, (3) he was terminated,
and (4) Sanderson successively hired three other people in
their thirties for the position. 102 Sanderson met its burden of
producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
action, "by offertng evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to
conclude that petitioner was fired because of his failure to
maintain accurate attendance records." 103
Reeves then
introduced evidence, believed by the jury, that this
explanation was pretextual, and offered additional evidence of
intentional age discrimination. This additional evidence
included evidence that Reeves was treated more harshly than
similarly situated younger employees, and that age-based
statements were made about him by the supervisor who
recommended his termination, specifically that "he 'was so
old [he] must have come over on the Mayflower,"' 104 and "that
he 'was too damn old to do [his] job. "" 05
Applying the pretext-plus doctrine, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals considered but was unconvinced by the additional
evidence and disregarded the evidence that established the
prima facie case and proved pretext. Justice O'Connor
described the appellate court's decision as follows:
[T]he Court of Appeals ignored the evidence supporting
petitioner's piima facie case and challenging respondent's
explanation for its decision. The Court confined its review
of evidence favoring petitioner to that evidence showing that
Chestnut had directed derogatory, age-based comments at
petitioner, and that Chestnut had singled out petitioner for
harsher treatment than younger employees. It is therefore
apparent that the court believed that only this additional
evidence of discrimination was relevant to whether the
jury's verdict should stand. That is, the Court of Appeals
proceeded from the assumption that a piima facie case of
discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for the
trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, is insufficient as
a matter of law to sustain a jury's finding of intentional
discrimination. In so reasoning, the Court of Appeals
misconceived the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs
who attempt to prove intentional discrimination through
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 2106.
Id.
Id. at 2110.
Id.
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106

Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Reeves thus
rejected the pretext-plus doctrine, and confirmed that "a
plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence
to fmd that the employer's asserted justification is false, may
permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer
unlawfully discriminated." 10' She provided this rationale for
the Court's conclusion:
Jn appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can
reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the
employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory
purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general
principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to
consider a pariy's dishonesty about a material fact as
"affirmative evidence of guilt."
Moreover, once the
employer's jus1;ification has been eliminated, discrimination
may well be the most likely alternative explanation,
especially since the employer is in the108best position to put
forth the actual reason for its decision.

The Court also noted that "there will be instances where,
although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and
set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's
explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the
109
action was discriminatory."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg discussed
circum-stances in which additional evidence will be necessary
for plaintiffs "to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of
law,"u 0 and anticipated "that such circumstances will be
uncommon," 111 because "the jury is entitled to treat a party's
112
dishonesty about a material fact as evidence of culpability."
A recent case in which summary judgment was granted
to the defendant, even though the plaintiff established his
prima facie case and a jury might have concluded that the
employer's explanation was pretextual, is Schnabel v.
Abramson. 113 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote:
106. Id. at 2108 (citations omitted).

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 2109.
Id. at 2108-09 (citations omitted}.
Id. at 2109.
Id. at 2112.
Id.
Id.
232 F.3d 83 {2d Cir. 2000). Schnabel, a sixty year old attorney, was
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[W]e hold that after Reeves, a court may, in appropriate
ctrcumstances, still grant a defendant's motion for
summary judgment-or judgment as a matter of law-on
an ADEA claim when a plaintiff has offered only a prima
facie case along with evidence that the defendant's stated
nondiscriminatory reasons for an adverse employment
114
action are pretextual.

The court explained that "the Supreme Court's decision
in Reeves clearly mandates a case-by-case approach, with a
court exaniining the entire record to determine whether the
plaintiff could satisfy his 'ultimate burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff."' 115
The court upheld summary
judgment for the defendant because "plaintiff has presented
no evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could base
the conclusion that age was a determinative factor in
115
defendant's decision to fire him."
The First Circuit Court of Appeals described the impact of
Reeves in a similar manner, in Fite v. Digital Equipment
Corp. 117 The court wrote:
Jn Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., the Supreme
Court made clear that 'the falsity of the employer's
explanation' may permit the jury to infer a discriminatory
motive but does not compel such a finding .... Obviously
whether in a particular case a prima facie showing of
discrimination and the disbelieved pretextual explanation
make a stronger or weaker
case for the plaintiff depends
118
very heavily on the facts.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon Reeves
in Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 119 and reversed a trial court

summary judgment in favor of an employer because of
evidence that established the prima facie case and proved
terminated from his investigator position with a county legal aid society, and was
replaced by a younger, former employee with a better employment record. Schnabel
was fired by the same Chief Attorney who hired him three years earlier. No additonal
evidence of age discrimination was available to Schnabel.
114. Id. at 91.
115. Id. at 90.
116. Id. See also James v. New York Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir.
2000) (upholding a trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment
because "James's evidence was insufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find
that age discrimination was the reason for his discharge . .. ").
117. 232 F.3d 3 (!st Cir. 2000).
118. Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
119. 225 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2000).
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pretext, combined with additional "evidence [consisting]
prinlarilY of disparaging age-related remarks made to Fisher
and other Pharmacia employees by members of Pharmacia's
management." 120 The same court, again relying on Reeves,
upheld the trial court's grant of a motion for judgment
as a
121
matter of law in Tatom v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., because "no
rational jury could find that Tatom's suspension122was the
result of intentional discrimination based on age."
These
post-Reeves decisions leave unclear the extent to which some
lower courts may limit the impact of the Reeves pretext-plus
holding by reviewing evidence to determine if a reasonable
jury could find for the plaintiff.
The procedural holdings of the Court in Reeves are as
important for employment litigation as the Court's rejection of
pretext-plus doctrine. The procedural holdings apply not just
123
to employment law cases, but to civil litigation in general.
They establish standards to control federal district court
judges when they rule on motions for judgment as a matter of
law, under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and motions for summary judgment, under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The standards articulated
in Reeves will curb the current practice of many federal
judges who, when dealing with employment law cases, invade
the province of the jury, evaluate the evidence in dispute, and
dispose of cases by granting defense motions for summary
judgment or judgment as a matter of law.
Rule 50 provides, in pertinent part:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard with

respect to an issue and there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for
that party with respect to that issue, the court may
determine the issue against that party and may grant a
motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party
with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the
controlling law be maintained or defeated without a

Id. at 922.
228 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2000).
Id. atCourt
932. made clear the obligation of trial courts to treat employment law
The
cases the same as other civil cases: "[Wle have reiterated that trial courts should not
treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact." Reeves, 120 S.
Ct. at 2109 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted}.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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favorable finding on that issue. 124

Rule 56 provides, In pertinent part:
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any
time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summ~5 judgment in
the party's favor upon all or any part thereof.

Rule 56 further provides: "The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
Interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter oflaw." 126
Rules 50 and 56 do not inform a federal judge as to how
evidence should be evaluated in determining, for purposes of
a Rule 50 motion, if there is a "legally sufficient evidentiary
basis" 12 ' for a jury to fmd for a party, or, for purposes of a
Rule 56 motion, if there is a "genuine issue as to any material
fact" 128 in dispute between the parties. Reeves fills this gap
with standards for review of evidence by a federal judge ruling
on either a Rule 50 or Rule 56 motion. First, the Court held
that "the standard for granting summary judgment 'mirrors'
the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that 'the
Inquiry under each is the same."" 29 The Court then held that
a trial judge: (1) "should review all of the evidence In the
record," 130 (2) "must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party," 131 and (3) "may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence," 132 because "[c]redibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of ajudge." 133 In addition, the trial judge
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

130.
131.
132.
133.

FED. R. CN. P. 50(a)(l).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
FED. R. CN. P. 56(c).
FED. R. CN. P. 50(a)(l).
FED. R. CN. P. 56(c).
Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2110.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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"must disregard all evidence favorable to134 the moving party
that the jury is not required to believe," and "should give
credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as
that evidence supporting the moving party that is
uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that
that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses."'"
The Fifth Circuit did not comply with these requirements
because it "disregarded critical evidence favorable to
[Reeves]-namely the evidence supporting petitioner's prtma
facie case and undermining respondent's nondiscriminatory
explanation." 136 The court "failed to draw all reasonable
137
inferences in favor of [Reeves]"
and "impermissibly
substituted its judgment concerning the weight of the
evidence for the jury's." 138 Therefore, it was error for the court
of appeals to overturn the jury verdict for Reeves. "Given that
petitioner established a prima facie case of discrimination,
introduced enough evidence for the jury to reject respondent's
explanation, and produced additional evidence of age-based
animus, there was sufficient evidence for the139
jury to find that
respondent had intentionally discriminated."
In both its pretext-plus and procedural holdings, Reeves
will have a significant impact on employment law litigation.
The predictable results will be more cases reaching juries and
more cases settling prior to trial.
IV. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE ADEA

- Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents
140

Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents is the latest in a series
of Supreme Court decisions that focus on state sovereign
immunity from law suits brought by private parties, based
upon the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
related principles of sovereign immunity. The Eleventh
Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id. at 2111.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 2112.
528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." 1' 1 In Kimel, the Court concluded that
Congress exceeded its authority under the Constitution when
it amended the ADEA to provide for law suits brought by
private individuals against the states.
The story told by the Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity cases begins in Georgia in 1793, with the federal
district court case that led to the Supreme Court's decision in
142
Chisolm v. Georgia.
Chisolm was based on the text of
Article III, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution which provides,
in relevant part, "The Judicial Power shall extend to
Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another
State ... "143 The Supreme Court applied this text literally in
Chisolm, an action of assumpsit brought by Chisolm, a
creditor, against the State of Georgia. The political result was
ratification in 1798 of the Eleventh Amendment. Although
the text of the Eleventh Amendment applies only to suits
brought against one state by citizens of another state (as in
Chisolm), the Supreme Court held in 1890, that the principles
of state sovereign immunity reflected in the Eleventh
Amendment also shield a state from law suits brought by
citizens of the same state. 144 The Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity shield, against actions by private
individuals, was lowered somewhat in 1908. In Ex Parte
145
Young,
the Court permitted actions against state officials,
sued in their official capacities for injunctive and declaratory
relief, but this did not permit actions against state officials if
retroactive money damages were sought. 146
Soon after Title VII was amended in 1972 to include
states as defendants, with potential liability to private
individuals for money damages, the Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity shield was used by the State of
Connecticut to defend against a Title VII s~x discrimination
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
U.S. CONST. Art. Ill,§ 2.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890).
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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action brought by retired state employees.
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The case,

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 147 reached the Supreme Court in 1976

and resulted in an opinion for the Court by then Justice
Rehnquist. The Court concluded that the 1972 amendments,
which extended Title VII to the states, were based upon an
exercise of pbwer by Congress under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress "power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." 148 The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause, which provides that "No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws," 149 provides protection from sex discrimination by a
state, and the 1972 amendments to Title VII provided a
statutory remedy for this constitutional violation. The Court
concluded "that the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of
state sovereignty which it embodies are necessarily limited by
the enforcement provisions of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 150 Therefore, "Congress may, in determining
what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for
private suits against States or state officials151which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts."
The Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of the
states was considered again by the Court in 1989, in
2
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co." Congress enacted legislation
that provided for suits by private individuals against states to
force states to pay part of the cost of environmental cleanup. The legislation was based upon the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution,"' and
not Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although there
was no majority opinion, the Court decided that Congress
had the power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of unconsenting
states, because the states consented to abrogation in advance
147. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 1.
150. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (citation omitted).

151. Id.
152. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
153. U.S. CONST. art. l, § 8, cl. 3.
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when they ratified the Constitution (containing the Commerce
Clause) in 1798.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas was overruled, in 1996, by
Seminole Iribe of Florida v. Florida, 154 a case that dealt with
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988. 155 This Act
provided for law suits in federal court brought by Indian
tribes against states. Congress enacted the legislation under
the Indian Commerce Clause, 155 not Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In Seminole Iribe, the Court
focused on two questions, first, whether Congress intended to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of the
states and, second, whether Congress had the power to do so
under the Indian Commerce Clause. The Court concluded
that "Congress has . . . provided an 'umnistakably clear'
statement of its intent to abrogate." 157 The Court then held
that Congress lacked the power under Article I of the
Constitution to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity of the states. The Court wrote:
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete
law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits
by private parties against unconsenting states. The
Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under
Article Ill, and Article 1 cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional
limitations
placed
upon
federal
158
jurisdiction.

A surprising development took place during the Court's
October 1998 Term, in Alden v. Maine, 159 an action by state
probation officers against the State of Maine alleging
violations of the FLSA. Because the FLSA was enacted under
Congress' Article I Commerce Clause power, Seminole llibe
superficially seemed to control and provide the state with
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. However, all prior
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity cases involved
litigation in federal court, and Alden was brought in a Maine
154.
155.
(1994).
156.
157.

517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996).
Pub. L. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988), codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21

U.S. CONST. art. I.§ 8, cl. 3.
SeminoleTribe,517U.S.at56.
158. Id. at 72-3 (citation omitted).
159. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). See supra notes 70-72 and acompanying text.
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state court. For Maine to prevail, it was necessary for
principles of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to
provide protection when cut completely away from Eleventh
Amendment textual moorings, because Alden was an action
by citizens against their own state, not another state, and the
jurisdiction of state courts, not federal courts, was at issue.
Undaunted by this lack of textual support in the
Constitution, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, "In light
of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the
Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from
private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation." 160
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Stevens, wrote a strong dissent disagreeing with the
majority's view of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
He wrote 'The Court's rationale for today's holding based on a
conception of sovereign immunity as somehow fundamental
to sovereignty or inherent in statehood fails for the lack of
any substantial support for such a conception in the thinking
of the founding era." 161 The modem day implications of the
majority's sovereign immunity doctrice were described by
Justice Souter as follows, "The Court's federalism ignores the
accepted authority of Congress to bind States under the FLSA
and to provide for enforcement of federal rights in state court.
The Court's history simply disparages the capacity of the
Constitution to order relationships in a Republic that has
changed since the founding." 162
The October 1999 Term also produced Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
163
Bank,
and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
164
Postsecondary Education Expense Board.
In each case the

Court held that
doctrine shields
statutes enacted
powers (and, in

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

•
'

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
states from private law suits based upon
by Congress under its Commerce Clause
the case of Florida Prepaid, the Patent

Alden, 527 U.S. at 754.
Id at 798 (Souter, J., dissenting).

Id. at 761.
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
527 U.S. 666 (1999).
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Clause), 165 as opposed to its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Based upon the cases discussed above, the test for
determining if a state is subject to federal claim litigation
brought by private parties, either in federal or state court, is
whether the underlying legislation was enacted by Congress
as a legitimate exercise of its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The key to determining if there was
a legitimate exercise of Section 5 power is a 1997 case, City of
Boerne v. F1ores. 166 City of Boerne was the basis for the
outcome in Kimel, and will determine the outcome during the
October 2000 term in Garrett v. Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama, 167 an Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity case that raises issues similar to those in Kimel,
but under the ADA rather than the ADEA.
City of Boerne evaluated the constitutionality of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 168 RFRA
was enacted by Congress in response to Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 169 in
which the Court held that the Free Exercise of Religion
Clause of the First Amendment 170 is not violated by a "valid
and neutral law of general applicability,"m even though the
law may have the effect of interfering with the free exercise of
RFRA replaced this permissive constitutional
religion.
standard and "prohibits '[g]overmnent' from 'substantially
burden[ing]' a person's exercise of n;ligion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability unless the
govermnent can demonstrate the burden '(l) is in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling govermnental
interest. •u 172
In enacting RFRA, Congress relied upon its powers under
165. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8.
166. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
167. 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000).
168. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb ·
1 to 4 (1994)).
169. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

171. Smith. 494 U.S. at 879.
172. City ofBoeme, 521 U.S. at 515-6.
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Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against
violations of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. The problem, however, was that very little
governmental action subject to the RFRA violated the Free
Exercise Clause, as the Clause was interpreted in Smith. The
City of Boerne Court held that for an exercise of Section 5
powers by Congress to be valid, "[t]here must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented and remedied and the means adopted to that
end." 173 This test distinguishes "between measures that
remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures
174
that make a substantive change in the governing law ... "
Congress may enact legislation under Section 5 to prevent
and remedy Fourteenth Amendment violations, but may not
enact legislation that, as expressed by the Court, "decree[s]
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on
the States. "175
In Kimel, the Court concluded that the intent of Congress
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of
the states was clear. 1"
It then considered the crucial
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity question, whether
the ADEA is based upon an exercise of power by Congress
under the Commerce Clause or an exercise of power by
Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
If
177
the former, then Congress exceeded its powers • If the
latter, and the congruence and proportionality test of City of
Boerne is satisfied, then Congress acted within its powers and
validly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity from ADEA
173. Id. at 520. The Court elaborated, "(T]here must be a congruence between the
means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial measures
must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measur_es appropriate to
address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another." Id. at 530 (citation
omitted). Later in the opinion, the Court wrote, "Remedial legislation under Section
5 should be adapted to fue mischief and wrong which the [Fourteenth! [AJmendment
was intended to provide against." Id, at 532 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted}.
174. Id.at519.
175. Id.
176. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 75- 76.
177. Id. at 79. ("Under our firmly established precedent then, if the ADEA rests
solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases
cannot maintain their suits against their state employers.").

I
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law suits brought by private individuals. 178
The Court considered whether or not the ADEA could be
justified as an exercise of power by Congress under Section 5.
Unfortunately for Daniel Kimel and other plaintiffs in the two
consolidated cases before the Court. the Court recognized
that, under its prior decisions, age is not a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 179 Accordingly, the Court observed,
"States may discriminate on the basis of age without
offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification
in question is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.""0 Age discrimination, however, may violate the
ADEA even if it is rational. The purpose of the ADEA is to
require that every employee or applicant for employment is
evaluated on the basis of individual ability and performance.
This is different from the Equal Protection Clause under
which "a State may rely on age as a proxy for other qualities,
abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the State's
legitimate interests. The Constitution does not preclude
reliance on such generalizations. That age proves to be an
inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant.'' 181
The Court stated that "Congress' power 'to enforce' the
Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to
deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting
a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which
is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text." 182 However,
"the same language that serves as the basis for the
178. Id. at 80. ("Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, does grant
Congress the authority to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity ...Accordingly.
the private petitioners in these cases may maintain their ADEA suits against the
States of Alabama and Florida if, and only if, the ADEA is appropriate legislation
under Section 5. ").
179. The Court concluded in three prior cases that age is not a suspect
classification. If the Court had decided otherwise, a state would be required to
justify an age-based classification by proving that there is a compelling governmental
interest seived by the classification, and that it was served by narrowly tailored
means.
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (involving mandatory
retirement of state court judges at the age of 70); Massachusetts Ed. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 301 {1976) (involving mandatory retirement of state police officers
at the age of 50); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1973) (involving mandatory
retirement of foreign service officers at age 60).
180. KimeL 528 U.S. at 83.
181. Id. at 84.
182. Id. at 81.
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affirmative grant of congressional power also serves to limit
that power." 183 The Court reviewed the legislative record,
which confirmed that "Congress' extension of the Act to the
States was an unwarranted response to a perhaps
inconsequential problem." 184
In the view of the Court,
"Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination
by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that
185
rose to the level of constitutional violation."
The Court
summarized its conclusion:
Judged against the backdrop of our equal protection
jurispru-dence, it is clear that the ADEA is so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed
to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. The Act, through its
broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating
factor, prohibits substantially more state employment
decisions and practices than would likely be held
unconstitutional under186the applicable equal protection,
rational basis standard.
The Kimel dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, objected strenuously to the
judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity that, in this case,
prevented the plaintiffs from suing their state employers for
violating their rights under the ADEA.
The dissent
characterized the "judicial activism" of the majority as
a
187
"radical departure from the proper role of this Court ... "
The impact of Kimel is mitigated, to some extent, because
the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of the states
has no impact on ADEA enforcement actions by the federal
govemment. 1" On the other hand, the enforcement resources
of the federal government are very limited, which is part of
the reason why Congress designed the ADEA to be enforced,
in large part, through private actions. The impact of Kimel
also is limited because the Eleventh Amendment sovereign

183. Id.
184. Id. at 89.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 86 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
187. Id. at 99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. In EEOC v.Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), the Court held that Congress had
the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the ADEA and make the ADEA

applicable to the states. Wyoming supports ADEA enforcement actions against the
states brought by the federal government.
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immunity of the states is inaplicable to actions by private
individuals "against a municipal corporation or other
governmental entity which is not an arm of the state." 189
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity "bars suits against
190
States but not lesser entities. "
As discussed earlier, the Court is about to decide Garrett,
an ADA case raising Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity issues. If the Court does not distinguish the age
discrimination claims in Kimel from the disability claims in
Garrett, and does not find a basis in Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment for enactment of the ADA, the result
will visit immense harm upon a particularly vulnerable group
of people who are harmed by state violations of the ADA in
many aspects of their lives, not just employment.
V. FLSA AND PuBLIC EMPLOYEES' ACCRUED COMPENSATORY TIME

-Christensen v. Harris County

The Supreme Court addressed the Fair Labor Standards
Act in Christensen v. Harris County. 191 The action was filed by
127 deputy sheriffs employed by Harris County, Texas. Each
deputy had individually agreed to accept compensatory time
in lieu of cash compensation 192 for overtime. 193 Since 1985,
the FLSA has authorized state and local governments to pay
compensatory time rather than monetary compensation for
overtime work, if the government has an agreement to do so
with the employees or their representative. 194 The statutory
provision sets a maximum number of hours of compensatory
time that may be accumulated. 195 Once the maximum is
reached, the statute requires the employer to pay monetary
compensation for overtime. 196 In addition, the statute requires
payment for unused compensatory time upon employment
Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.
Id.
120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000).
See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)[3)[A) (1994).
193. Although the deputies were represented by an association, Texas law
prohibited the county from bargaining with the association so individual agreements
for compensatory time were necessary pursuant to the statute. See Moreau v.
Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1993).
194. 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(o)[l),(2) (1994).
195. Id. § 207(o)[3)[A).
196. Id.§ 207(o)[3)[A).
189.
190.
191.
192.
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termination. 197 Because the county was concerned about its
potential liability for large cash payments to employees
leaving their jobs with large accumulations of compensatory
time, it forced employees to use compensatory time once they
had reached a specified accumulation below the statutory
maximum. 198 The county implemented the requirement over
the objections of the employees despite an opinion letter from
the Department of Labor advising the county that such a
requirement was permissible under the statute only if the
agreement with employees for compensatory time included
such a provision.
The employees filed suit alleging that the county's policy
violated Section 207(o)(5) of the FLSA, which provides that
employees who request to use accrued compensatory time
shall be permitted to do so within a reasonable period unless
it would unduly disrupt the operations of the employer. 199
The employees argued that this provision specifies the
exclusive procedure for utilization of compensatory time,
absent agreement with the employees to another method.
The district court agreed, 200 but the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed.'01 The appellate majority found a
default principle that the employer was free to set workplace
rules unless the statute or an agreement with employees
provided otherwise. Since the statute did not directly address
the issue, the employer's policy stood. The court expressly
rejected the contrary holding of the Eighth Circuit in Heaton
v. Moore202 that banked compensatory time was the property
of the employee, to be used as the employee chose so long as
it did not unduly disrupt the operations of the employer.
The case generated five opinions in the Supreme Court: a
majority opinion, two concurrences and two dissents. Justice
197. Id. § 207(o)(4).

198. Employees were encouraged to use their time as they approached the
maximum but if they did not, the supe:rvisor could schedule them to use their
compensatory time involuntarily. Christensen, 120 S. Ct at 1659.
199. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5) (1994).
200. Moreau v. Harris County, 945 F.Supp. 1067 (S.D. Tex. 1996), rev'd, 158 F.3d
241 (5th Cir. 1998}, aifd sub nom, Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655
(2000).
201. Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1998). aifd sub nom,
Chrtstensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000).
202. 43 F.3d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1994).
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Thomas wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter and, with the
exception of one section, by Justice Scalia.
The majority rejected the argument of the plaintiffs,
supported by the Secretary of Labor, that the statute set forth
the exclusive method for use of compensatory time. Rather
the majority viewed the statute as a "minimal guarantee" that
the employee would be able to use the compensatory time
when requested. The interpretation urged by the employees
would, according to the majority, "convert Section
207(o)(3)(A)'s [maximum accrual limit] shield into a sword," 20'
an argument made by the employer. Since the statute
permits employers to decrease the number of hours an
employee works, and to cash out accumulated compensatory
time by paying the employee for each hour, the employer is
also free to do both of these things at once by forcing an
employee to use compensatory time.
Section III of the majority opinion, which Justice Scalia
expressly declined to join, held that opinion letters of
administrative agencies are not entitled to Chevron
deference. 204 In Chevron, the Court held that courts must
defer to administrative agency regulations which reasonably
interpret an ambiguous statute. The majority concluded that
opinion letters are not entitled to the same deference that
Chevron commanded courts to afford to agency regulations.
Furthermore, the majority read the. Secretary's regulation,
which provided that the agreement between the employer and
the employee "may include other provisions governing the
preservation, use, or cashing out of compensatory time ... "
as permissive, rather than mandatory. 205 Like the court of
appeals, the majority looked for an express prohibition on the
employer's policy in the statute or regulations and found
none.
Justice Souter's brief concurrence agreed with the
majority based on the assumption that the ,opinion does not
prevent the Secretary from issuing a regulation prohibiting
203. Christensen. 120 S. Ct. at 1661.
204. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resomces Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
205. Christensen. 120 S. Ct. at 1663, quoting 29 C.F.R. § 553.23(a)(2).
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the conduct engaged in by the employer. ' Justice Scalia's
concurrence disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the
opinion letter was not entitled to Chevron deference and
would further find that the Secretary's brief alone would be
sufficient to require such deference.2°' Nevertheless, because
he concluded that the Secretary's opinion was not a
reasonable interpretation of the statute under Chevron, he
joined the remainder of the majority opinion.2°'
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
dis-sented, reading the statutory amendments regarding
compensatory time as permitting compensatory time in lieu of
cash payments only pursuant to agreement with the
employees.
Based on this general rule, the dissenters
concluded that compensatory time is permissible payment for
overtime only on terms agreed to by the employees. Absent
agreement on the method for using compensatory time, it can
be used only in strict accordance with the statute. This
burden on the employer, which the majority sought to avoid,
is imposed by the statutory requirements for overtime pay.
The employer concerned about employee use of compensatory
time is free to cash out employees' compensatory time, seek
an agreement with its employees to permit forced use of
compensatory time, or hire more employees to avoid the
overtime requirements, a primary initial purpose of the FLSA.
Justice Stevens also noted that the Secretary of Labor's
position was entitled to "respect" as "thoroughly considered
20
and consistently observed." '
Justice Breyer's separate dissent, joined by Justice
Ginsburg and agreed to by Justice Stevens in a footnote,
focused on the Chevron deference issue. Unlike
Justice
210
Scalia, Justice Breyer argued that Skidmore
deference,
which directs courts to look for guidance to expert agency
views even where they are not an "exercise of delegated
lawmaking authority" 211 survives Chevron. In Skidmore, the
Court held that, in interpreting statutes, courts may give
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 1663 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 1664-65 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1665.
120 S. Ct. at 1667 (Stevens, J .. dissenting).
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
Id. at 139-40.
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weight to the views of administrative agencies expressed in
forms other than regulations issued pursuant to delegated
rulemaking authority, because such views are informed by
the expertise of the agency. 212 Justice Breyer found the
agency's position persuasive and reasonable regardless of
whether Chevron or Skidmore was the appropriate framework
for consideration of the agency's position and thus would
212
have ruled for the employees.
This is the third time since the 1985 compensatory time
amendments that the Supreme Court has addressed the
scope of the FLSA overtinle provisions for public employees.
In each case, the employees lost on the ultimate question,
214
limiting their right to overtime compensation.
In Auer v.
Robbins, however, the Court deferred to the Secretary's
irlterpretation of the statutory exemption for administrators,
executives and professionals."' The Court unanimously
deferred both to a regulation and to the Secretary's
interpretation of the regulation articulated in an amicus brief,
stating that the interpretation was controlling unless it was
either clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
The deference to the Secretary's interpretation, which favored
the employer in Auer, is absent from the majority opinion in
Christensen, even though the regulation seems at least open
to the reading given by the Secretary.
The Christensen decision appears driven by a concern for
protecting state and local governments
from federal
regulation, and particularly from the financial impact of
federal regulatory requirements, a concern which has led the
Court in the last several years to strike down or limit federal
212. The Court in Skidmore stated that such views do not have the "power to
control" the courts but may have the "power to persuade." Id. at 140.
213. Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1687-68 {Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
argued that Skidmore deference is an anachronism. He would defer under Chevron,
or not at all. Id. at 1664 {Scalia, J., concurring).
214. In Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22 (1993), the Court held that the
employer did not have to enter into an agreement with' the employees' union
representative in order to pay compensatory time in lieu of cash, where state law
prohibited collective bargaining. Id. at 35. In Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997),
the Court held that the St. Louis police department did not have to pay overtime
compensation to sergeants and a lieutenant because they were salaried employees
exempt from the statute, despite a manual that "nominally'' subjected them to
reductions in pay for disciplinary reasons and one instance of such a reduction. Id.
at 458·59.
215. 519 U.S, at 456·59.
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regulation of state and local government in a number of
cases. 216 The employer's articulated rationale for its policy
was financial, and its brief emphasized financial concerns.
The majority stated, "Petitioner's position would convert
Section 207(o)(3)(A)'s shield into a sword, forcing employers to
pay cash compensation instead of providing
compensatory
217
time to employees who work overtime."
Of course, the
employer correctly argued that concern for the financial
implications of imposing overtime requirements on public
bodies motivated the compensatory provisions in the first
instance, but the amendments strove to balance the
employees' right to overtime compensation with the financial
needs of the governmental unit. Where no union represents
the employees for collective bargaining, the agreement with
employees that is required to implement a compensatory time
program is nothing more than notification to the employees
and lack of express objection.21" Thus, mandating that the
agreement incorporate any policy requiring employees to use
accumulated compensatory time does not significantly
interfere with employer efforts to limit financial liability.
The issue of the scope of Chevron deference may have
significance for other areas of employment law involving
administrative agency regulations. The justices disagreed
about the requisite level of deference due adlninistrative
agency interpreta-tions of statutes which are contained in
forms other than regulations issued pursuant to
congressionally delegated authority. Chief Justice Rehnquist
216. See, e.g .. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (discussed
supra notes 176-90 and accompanying text); Vermont Agency of Natural Resources
v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000) (discussed infra notes 280-84 and
accompanying text); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(discussed supra notes 15962 and accompanying text); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)(discussed supra notes 163-65 and
accompanying text); Gebser v. Lago lndep. Sch. Dist .. 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (limiting
Uability of public school district under Title IX); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997) (discussed supra notes 166-75 and accompanying text): Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot constitutionally force
officers of the state to enforce a federal regulatory scheme); Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Flortda, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (discussed supra notes 154-58 and accompanying
text). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia. Kennedy, Thomas and O'Connor,
in the majority in the instant case, consistently voted for states' rights in the cases
set forth above with one exception, Justice O'Connor's dissenting vote in City of
Boerne.
217. Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1661.
218. Id. at 1659 n.l.
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and Justices Thomas, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter would
give such interpretations only "respect" "to the extent" that
they "have the 'power to persuade.'" 219 The majority conceded,
however, that in accordance with the earlier decision in Auer,
the agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to
deference where the Court finds the regulation ambiguous.220
Justice Scalia would apply Chevron deference to any
authoritative agency position, including a brief, so long as it
is a "fair and considered judgment. "221 He would defer to the
agency's interpretation of a statute or its own regulation, so
long as the interpretation of the statute is reasonable.222
Justices Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg appear to agree with
Justice Scalia, although they contend that both levels of
deference survive. Thus, it appears that, in accord with Auer,
all nine justices would defer to a reasonable agency
interpretation of an ambiguous regulation, while only four
would defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute
that is not contained in a regulation. The issues of whether a
regulation is ambiguous and whether it is a reasonable
interpretation of a statute leave substantial room for debate
in any given case. This ongoing debate about the level of
deference due to agency action is likely to continue and
Christensen does little to clarify the standard. Indeed, by
limiting Auer to ambiguous regulations, it may muddy the
waters further.
VI. ERISA AND HMO MIXED ELIGIBILITY AND TREATMENT
DECISIONS- Pegram v. Herdrich

In Pegram v. Herdrich, 223 a case much touted by the
media,224 the Court decided unanimously that an HMO may
not be sued for breach of fiduciary duty based on the
existence of financial incentives which paid bonuses to the
doctor-owners at year's end, encouraging them to make
coverage and treatment decisions that minimized costs to the
219. 120 S. Ct. at 1663.
220. Id. at 1663.
221 Id. at 1665 (Scalia, J., Concurring).
222. Id.
223. 120 S.Ct. 2143 (2000).
224. This discussion of the case benefitted from the American Bar Association
Teleconference, The Supreme Court Speaks: Herdrich v. Pegram, June 30, 2000.
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HMO. The plaintiff, Cynthia Herdrich, visited an HMO doctor
who, after discovering an inflamed mass in her abdomen,
required her to wait eight days for an ultrasound to be
performed at an HMO facility 50 miles away. During the
wait, her appendix ruptured and she suffered from
peritonitis, causing severe infection and requiring
hospitalization. She filed an action for malpractice and
several state law fraud claims. She won the former at trial
while the latter were found preempted by ERISA after removal
to federal court. She then amended her complaint to allege a
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. The ERISA count was
dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court, fmding that the HMO acted as a fiduciary under ERISA
in making decisions about claims, referrals, and the nature,
225
duration and location of treatment.
While disclaiming
intent to find that incentives automatically breach fiduciary
duty, the panel majority concluded that the plaintiffs
allegations, that the particular incentive structure breached
the fiduciary duty to act solely in the interest of participants
and beneficiaries of the fund by encouraging physicians to
delay or withhold treatment to increase their bonuses,
adequately stated a claim under ERISA.
Judge Flaum, dissenting, argued that a mere structural
incentive to deny care does not state a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty. He suggested that the market incentives to the
contrary provide adequate protection and that judicial
determinations about permissible levels of incentives are
"unnecessary and ill-advised." 22' Judge Flaum suggested that
such incentives might support a claim where there was a
breakdown in the market or negotiating process such that the
incentives were not the result of a fair bargain between the
HMO and the plan sponsor and beneficiaries, or where there
221
was nondisclosure of the incentive.
The opinion by Justice Souter began with a discussion of
225. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998). rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000).
226. Id. at 383 (Flaum, J .. dissenting).
227. A petition for rehearing en bane was denied over a dissent authored by Judge
Easterbrook. 170 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 1999).
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the differences between traditional fee for service and
managed care, noting that managed care was designed to
remove the incentive to provide unnecessary treatment to
increase physician income. Justice Souter then pointed out
that managed care inherently includes incentives to ration
treatment and that any judgment about the legality of such
incentives necessarily required the court to make a judgment
about "socially acceptable medical risk," 228 a task better left to
the legislature. The plaintiff challenged the particular
structure of the HMO. Under that structure, the physicians
with discretion to determine the medical necessity of
treatment under the plan had a direct financial incentive to
deny treatment or to provide it through HMO facilities
because, as owners of the HMO, they received bonuses from
minimizing treatment.'" The Court rejected the plaintiffs
attempt to narrow the legal challenge and, having assumed
that the plaintiffs argument would require all similar HMO
decisions to be subjected to fiduciary duty standards
regardless of the structure of the HMO, the Court necessarily
concluded that the complaint stated no cause of action. 230 To
reach that decision the Court first analyzed the statutory
definition of fiduciary.
Under the statute, a fiduciary is a person who manages,
administers or advises financially an ERISA plan, exercising
discretionary authority."'
The Court indicated that a
fiduciary under ERISA is permitted to wear "two hats." 232 For
example, an employer may be' a plan sponsor and
administrator.
When an employer is acting as plan
administrator making discretionary decisions, it must act
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of
the plan233 but when acting as the employer of the
228. Pegram. 120 S. Ct. at 2150.
229. Id. at 2147 & n.3.
230. Id. at2150·5L
231. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2l)(A) (1994).
232. Pegram. 120 S. Ct. at 2152.
233. ln Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996), the Court found that an
employer was acting as plan administrator and fiduciary when it convinced
employees to change employers, assuring them that their benefits would be
maintained, despite knowledge of the precarious financial condition of the new
company. Thus, the employer was liable for breach of fiduciary duty to the
employees, who lost benefits as a result of the change.
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participants and beneficiaries, no such requirement attaches.
Like an employer, the doctors at the HMO wore two hats they made both treatment decisions, in which they did not
act as ERISA fiduciaries, and eligibility decisions, in which
they did. But as the Court noted, the two types of decisions
were inextricably intertwined.
The Court proclaimed some difficulty in determining
precisely what the plaintiff alleged in her complaint as a
breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the HMO. Ultimately,
the Court concluded that the plaintiff was challenging
determinations as to whether treatments were medically
necessary, which the Court characterized as a "miXed
eligibility decision." 234 According to the Court, Congress did
not intend such decisions to be fiduciary decisions under
ERISA. Congress' focus was on financial decisions by plan
trustees. Moreover, the Court foresaw dire consequences if
such decisions were subject to fiduciary limitations. For
profit HMOs would be eliminated because of incentives to
limit costs, incentives which the Congress encouraged in
enacting the HMO Act only one year before ERISA was
passed. Nonprofit HMOs would also be at risk, threatening
an "upheaval" in the health care industry which the Court did
not want to initiate. 235 The Court also reasoned that it would
be difficult to articulate a rule that would not encourage HMO
doctors to engage in the very practice HMOs were designed to
eliminate, costly and unnecessary treatment of patients. And
whatever the rule, the HMO's defense would be that the
treatment offered was appropriate medical practice,
transforming fiduciary actions into malpractice claims,
providing little to the ERISA beneficiary except a deeper
pocket for such actions. In addition, it would raise an issue
as to whether ERISA preempts state malpractice claims. This
parade of negative consequences con-vinced the Court 236
that
no cause of action was stated by the plaintiffs complaint.
Physician incentives in HMOs have been widely criticized
in both the popular and medical press. Had the Court ruled
otherwise, it would have provided patients with an important
234. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2155.
235. Id. at 2156.
236. Id. at 2157.
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vehicle for suing HMOs for denying or refusing to pay for
treatment. Interestingly, the ERISA allegations in Herdrich's
case were triggered by the HMO's preemption defense to
Herdrich's original state law fraud claims. The defendant
removed the original action to federal court based on its
claimed fiduciary status under ERISA. 237 When the plaintiff
amended the complaint to allege a breach of fiduciary duty,
defendant argued that it was not a fiduciary for purposes of
the allegations made by the plaintiff. The Court rejected the
plaintiffs estoppel argument. 238
Now plaintiffs must rely on Congress to enact legislation
allowing patients to sue HMOs, 239 or on the growing trend in
state courts to allow suits against HMOs despite ERISA
preemption arguments. 240 While Varity v. Howe gave some
hope to participants that actions for breach of fiduciary duty
might provide recovery for individual losses by fmding that an
employer making representations to employees about the
plan acted as plan administrator and thus as fiduciary rather
than employer, 241 Pegram bars such actions, at least where
the challenge is to medical necessity determinations by the
HMO. Prior to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Pegram, the
Eighth Circuit permitted a suit for breach of fiduciary duty
against an HMO for failure to disclose physician incentives, 242
but the Supreme Court construed Herdrich's claim to
237. Id. at 2154 n.8.
238. Id.
239. Legislation addressing the relationship of HMOs and ERISA is currently
pending in both the House and the Senate. See H.R. 2990, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.,
145 Cong. Rec. H9523·01 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1999): S. 1344, 106th Cong. 1st Sess.,
145 Cong. Rec. S8623 (daily ed. July 15, 1999) (bill passed as amended); 106th
Congress, 1st Session, 145 Cong Rec S 12728 (daily ed. October 15, 1999) (vitiating
previous passage and postponing indefinitely by unanimous consent); H.R.Res. 348,
106th Cong., 1st Sess., 145 Cong Rec. Hl 1341 (daily ed. Nov . 2, 1999) (House
disagrees with Senate amendment to H.R. 2990 and agrees to conference). A major
area of disagreement has been whether to provide individuals with the right to sue
HMOs. See Suzanne Carter, Recent Legislation: Health Care and ERISA, 36 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 561, 561 (1999); Michael E. Ginsburg, Recent Legisla~on: HMO Grievance
Processes, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 237, 237 (2000); Harvey Berkman, New Suits Preempt
HMO Move by House, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 1999, at Al.
240. For discussion of the preemption issue as it relates to state tort claims, see
Stephen F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The Sounds of Silence: The Libertarian
Ethos of ERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L. REv.l (2000); Dawn Lauren Morris, ERJSA
Preemption, HMOs and Denial of Bene.fit Claims, 59 LA. L. REV. 961 (1999}.
241. See supra note 232.
242. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
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challenge the provision of the incentives rather than the lack
of disclosure. 243 Employer advocates have expressed concern
about the plethora of class actions against HMOs based on
244
allegations of failure to disclose incentives.
The decision in
Pegram did not assuage the concern. leaving open the
possibility that an HMO is a fiduciary with respect to plan
245
administration and thus has a duty to disclose incentives.
Nor does it indicate which other types of decisions by HMOs
246
might be subject to fiduciary requirements under ERISA.
The implications of Pegram for ERISA preemption are yet
to be determined. Just a week after the decision in Pegram,
the Court granted certiorart and vacated and remanded an
ERISA preemption decision to the Supreme 247
Court of
Pennsylvania for reconsideration in light of Pegram.
In that
case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had concluded that
ERISA did not preempt a state law negligence action against
an HM0. 248 The court read the Supreme Court's recent
preemption jurisprudence as narrowing the class of cases in
249
which ERISA preempts state law claims.
Notably, in
Pegram, the Court acknowledged the narrowing shift in
preemption law but suggested that the state and alleged
federal law claims in Pegram were sufficiently close to raise a
substantial preemption question which could be avoided by
250
finding no federal cause of action.
The HMO in the Pennsylvania case was sued for denials
and delays in authorizing necessary medical treatment for an
emergency.
The concurring justice reasoned that the
decisions being challenged were "individual medical
decisions" rather than plan administration decisions and
thus not preempted. 251 Given that the actions of the HMO
243. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2154 n.8
244. See William J. Kilberg, The Impending Collision Between HMOs and ERISA:
Can Either Emerge Unscathed?, 25 EMP. REL. L.J. 1 {2000).
245. See Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2154 n.8.
246. For example, if the HMO uses a utilization review process with a board of
doctors to determine whether treatment is medically necessary, are those decisions
mixed decisions under Pegram or fiduciary decisions regarding plan administration?
247. U. S. Healthcare Sys., Pa. v. Pennsylvania Hosp. Ins. Co., 120 S. Ct. 2686
(2000).
248. Pappas v. Asbel. 724 A.2d 889 (Pa.1998).
249. Id. at 892-93.
250. Pegram. 120 S. Ct. at 2158.
251. 724 A.2d at 894-95 (Nigro, J., concurring).
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were similar in Pegram and the Pennsylvania case, the
Court's action vacating the decision fmding no preemption is
curious. Pegram, however, casts doubt on the preemption
analyses of some lower courts which made a distinction
between claims relating to quality of care, which are not
preempted, and those relating to quantity of care, which
are. 252 Instead, Pegram found a category of mixed decisions.
The implication of this categorization for preemption is
uncertain. 253 If the Pennsylvania preemption decision stands,
Pegram may tum out to be a double-edged sword for HMOs,
relieving them of ERISA liability but subjecting them to state
254
negligence claims.
VII. ERISA ACTIONS AGAINST NONFIDUCIARIES - Harris Trust
and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.

In Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc., 255 the Court decided that ERISA allows a private
action by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary against a
nonfiduciary party in interest who participated in a
prohibited transaction. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, a
fiduciary trustee of Ameritech's Pension Trust, sued Salomon
Smith Barney alleging that Salomon engaged in a prohibited
transaction while serving as a broker-dealer to the trust.
Salomon sold interests in motel properties to the trust
through the trust's investment manager, a fiduciary. The
interests, purchased by the plan for ·$21 million, ultimately
252. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1009 (1995).
253. The delays in Pappas were caused by the HMO, not the treating doctor,
raising the question of whether that distinguishes the case from Herdrich where the
treating doctor was an owner of the HMO.
254. The Court has granted certiorari in another case that deals with the scope of
ERISA preemption. In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 989 P.2d 80 [Wash. 1999), cert. granted,
120 S. Ct. 2687 (2000), the Washington Supreme Court held that a state law that
revoked ERISA plan beneficiary designations in the event of divorce was not
preempted by ERISA. The Court's decision in Egelhoff may provide some direction
regarding the scope of preemption. Although the Court has narrowed the scope of
preemption in recent years, consistent with its general approach to federalism
issues, Egelhoff presents the Court with an issue of whether to preempt a state law
that may directly affect administration of multistate plans. Absent preemption,
multlstate plans may be subject to differing laws in different states, some of which
may conflict with the ERISA requirement to administer the plan in accordance -with
its terms.
255. 120 S. Ct. 2180 (2000).
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proved virtually worthless, and Harris sued Salomon to
recover the money paid. The basis of the action was that
Section 406(a) prohibited sales of property between the plan
and parties in interest. 256 Salomon moved for dismissal
arguing that, even if the transaction was prohibited, ERISA
authorized suit only against the fiduciary who caused the
plan to enter into the prohibited transaction. The district
court denied the motion"' but the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that Section 406(a) applies only to the conduct of
fiduciaries and, accordingly, no cause of action existed
against a nonfiduciary. 258 The Seventh Circuit's view diverged
from that of other circuits which had held that Section
502(a)(3) authorized a civil suit against a nonfiduciary
involved in a prohibited transaction. 259
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Thomas,
the Court agreed that Section 406(a) applied only to
fiduciaries, but disagreed that Section 406(a) limited the
causes of action available under Section 502(a)(3), a remedial
provision that does not specify the defendants. Section
502(a)(3) authorizes civil actions "by a participant, beneficiary
or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates
any provision of [ERISA Title I] or the terms of the plan, or (B)
to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the
terms of the plan. "260 Since the section does not limit the
defendants, but rather allows appropriate equitable relief for
an act or practice which violates ERISA, it permits a civil
claim against a party in interest. While the Court did not
consider itself restricted by the literal language of Section
406(a), which specifies that a fiduciary shall not cause the
256. 29 U.S.C. § JI06(a)[l)[A) (1994). states: "(a) Except as provided in section
1108 of this title: (1) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to
engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that ·such transaction
constitutes a direct or indirect-(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property
between the plan and a party in interest .. , {D} transfer to, or use by or for the
benefit of, a parly in interest, of any assets of the plan .... "
257. Hanis Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Bros., 20 Empl. Ben. Cas. (BNA) 1449
(N.D.Ill. 1996), rev"d, 184 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 1999)., rev'd. 120 S. Ct. 2180 (2000).
258. Harrts Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Bros., 184 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 1999),
rev"d, 120 S. Ct 2180 (2000).
259. See 120 S.Ct. at 2186 (citing cases and observing that "the Seventh Circuit
departed from the uniform position" of the other circuits).
260. Id. at 2187. quoting 29 U.S.C. § !132 (a)[3) (1994).
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plan to engage in a prohibited transaction, it relied on other
sections of the statute to confirm that Section 502(a)(3)
authorized the action. Section 502(1) authorizes the Secretary
of Labor to assess civil penalties against fiduciaries and other
persons, and defines the penalties by reference to the amount
ordered to be paid in a civil action brought by the Secretary
under Section 502(a)(5). Since the wording of Sections
502(a)(5) and (3) is similar, the Court reasoned that if the
secretary could bring a civil action against a person other
than a fiduciary, then the participants, beneficiaries and
2 1
fiduciaries could also. "
The Court analogized to the common law of trusts, which
allows an action for recovery of property or disgorgement of
proceeds and profits against a third person who has
possession of trust property, even where that person was not
the primary wrongdoer.
The Court rejected various
arguments of Salomon suggesting that an interpretation
allowing a cause of action would discourage dealings with
ERISA plans, or encourage parties to charge higher prices to
plans to compensate for potential liability. Salomon also
argued that recognizing the cause of action would allow
imposition of liability on the innocent based on a law suit by
the guilty fiduciary. The Court found the statutory language
clear and refused to depart from the language based on
arguments regarding either the legislative history or the
consequences of its decision. 2 " 2 The Court did suggest that
concerns about requiring parties engaged in transactions
with plans to monitor complicity with ERISA's complex
provision might influence judicial decisions regarding the
circumstances under which liability should be imposed on
263
nonfiduciaries.
While recovery from fiduciaries
for
prohibited
transactions was always available, the decision provides
another avenue for recovering plan assets lost through
prohibited transactions. If the fiduciary. has insufficient
assets or insurance, an action against the nonfiduciary
involved in the transaction will now be available. What the
261. Id. at 2188.
262. Id. at 2191.
263. Id. at 2190-91.
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Court did not decide was the standard for imposition of
liabili1y on nonfiduciaries.
Whether liabili1y requires
knowledge that the transaction is prohibited or some other
level of knowledge is left for another day.
VIII. NONEMPLOYMENT CASES WITH EMPLOYMENT LAW IMPACT-

Beck v. Prupis. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert
Construction Co., and Vennont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States

Increasingly, plaintiffs' attorneys are bringing actions on
behalf of employees using vehicles other than traditional
264
employment law.
In Beck v. Prupis,
the Court
substantially limited employees' abili1y to use RICO to
challenge terminations. The plaintiff, Robert Beck, filed a
RICO action against other officers and directors of a Florida
insurance holding company after he was terminated, allegedly
for reporting their fraudulent activi1y to insurance regulators.
In addition to allegations of racketeering activi1y in
connection with the fraud, Beck asserted that his termination
violated RICO because it was done in furtherance of the
defendant's conspiracy to violate RICO. The district court
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
ground that employees terminated for threatening to report
RICO activities or refusing to participate in them have no
265
standing to sue for damages from the loss of employment.
The Court of Appeals held that the statute required that the
plaintiff be injured by an act of racketeering, not merely an
266
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Lower courts had divided over whether persons injured
by an overt act that was not itself racketeering activi1y,
but
267
that furthered the conspiracy, could sue under RIC0.
The
264.
265,
266.
267.

120 S. Ct. 1608 (2000).

Id. at 1612.

Becks v. Prnpis, 162 F.3d 1090 (11th Cir. 1998).
Compare Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert,
denied. 508 U.S. 957 (1993); Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir.
1991); Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d (9th Cir. 1990), cert. dented. 502 U.S.
921 (1991), and Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990}
with Khurana v. Innovative Healthcare Sys., Inc., 130 F3d 143 (5th Cir. 1997),
vacated sub nom, Teel v. Khurana, 525 U.S. 979 (1998); Schiffels v. Kemper
Financial Servs., Inc., 978 F.2d 344 {7th Cir. 1992); Shearing v. E.F. Hutton Group,

L
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Supreme Court resolved the split in the circuits on this issue,
siding with the Eleventh Circuit in Beck. Justice Thomas'
opinion relied on the common law to interpret the statute.
Since the well-settled common law at the time of RICO's
enactment provided that a plaintiff could sue for civil
conspiracy only if he or she was injured by a tortious act, the
Court concluded that Congress must have intended RICO's
conspiracy provisions to be interpreted in accord with the
widely accepted common law. 268 Since plaintiffs termination
was not itself an act of racketeering as defined by the statute,
plaintiff stated no claim under RICO. The plaintiff argued
that such an interpretation would render meaningless the
section of the statute under which the plaintiff sued, because
racketeering activity would be actionable under other
statutory sections. The Court responded that the section
permitted the plaintiff to sue co-conspirators who might not
have violated the substantive provisions individually. 269
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, dissented,
disputing the majority's conclusion that the common law
required the result reached. 270 Justice Stevens argued that
the plain language of the statute supported plaintiffs claim
and imposed no requirement that the overt act causing his
injury be of any particular kind, other than an act in
furtherance of the conspiracy. 2 ' 1 Further, he pointed out that
racketeering activities themselves are not independently
wrongful under RICO as the majority suggested, although
they may be under other statutes, but only violate RICO if
they transgress the specific prohibitions of Section 1962. In
that event, they would be actionable under one of the other
provisions of the statute. 272
The Court's decision virtually eliminates RICO claims
challenging terminations effectuated to allow continuation of
Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989).
268. 120 S. Ct. at 1614-15.
269. Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful for a person to conspire to violate any of
the provisions of the substantive subsections, 1962(a}, (b) and (c), which prohibit
using a pattern of racketeering activity to establish, operate, acquire, control, or
conduct an enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
270. Justice Stevens factually distinguished each case cited by the majority from
the case at bar. Beck, 120 S. Ct. at 1618-19 (Steven, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 1620.
272. Id. at 1619-20.
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conduct prohibited by RICO, e.g., use of a pattern of
racketeering to operate an enterprise. Plaintiffs still may
have a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy, or a statutory whistleblower's claim where such
statutes exist and apply to the specific facts relating to the
termination. In states where no such cause of action exists,
such as New York,'73 or states where the action is limited, like
Virginia, 274 plaintiffs may have no recourse.
The Court decided two other nonemployment cases that
have potential impact for employment law and employees. In
a commercial arbitration case, Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bilt
275
Harbert Construction Co.,
the Court held that the Federal
Arbitration Act's (FAA) venue provisions are permissive rather
than mandatory. Thus, actions to confirm, vacate or modify
an arbitration award may' be brought in the district in which
the award was made, as provided by the FAA, 276 or in any
district that is proper under the general venue statute.
Employment arbitration actions frequently are brought under
the FAA, and the Court is currently considering Circuit City
277
Stores v. Adams,
in which the issue is the scope of the
exclusion for employment contracts contained in Section 1 of
the FAA. 278 The majority of circuit courts have read the
exclusion for employment conracts in the FAA to apply only
to contracts of employment of workers who are directly
273. See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E. 2d 86 (N.Y. 1983)
{declining , absent legislative action, to recognize a cause of action for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy based on termination for reporting illegal
account manipulations which resulted in large bonuses for company officers}.
274. See Dray v. New Market Poultry Prods., Inc., 518 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 1999)

(finding no claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy for reporting
adulterated products to government inspector as no generalized whistleblower claim
in Virginia and the statute designed to prohibit distribution of adulterated poultry
products gave no rights to the plaintiff, but instead was a governmental regulato:ty
mechanism).
275. 120 S. Ct. 1331 (2000).
276. § u.s.c. §§ 9. 10, 11 (1994).
277. 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2004 (2000).

278. The FAA provision at issue states '"Commerce,' as herein defined, means
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and
another, or between any such Territo:ty and any State or foreign nation, or between
the District of Columbia and any State or Territo:ty, or foreign nation, but nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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engaged in the movement of goods or people in interestate
commerce.279 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that all
employment contracts are excluded from the coverage of the
FAA. 280 If the Ninth Circuit's view prevails in the Supreme
Court, arbitration agreements in employment contracts will
be enforceable only under applicable state laws. If the Court
in Circuit City follows the majority of circuits, however, and
reads the employment contract exclusion narrowly,
employees and employers may have a wider range of venue
options in actions under the FAA to confirm, vacate or modify
employment arbitration decisions.
Vemwnt Agency of Natural Resources v. United States,281
another nonemployment case, also has relevance for
employees. In Vemwnt, an employee of a state agency sued
the agency in a qui tam suit on behalf of the United States.
The plaintiff alleged that the agency defrauded the federal
government by requiring employees to report their hours of
work on a federal project falsely, thereby increasing the
federal money to which the agency was entitled. 282 The
federal False Claims Act'" allows a private person to bring a
qui tam action against the false claimant on behalf of himself
and the federal government to recover damages. The private
relator receives a portion of the recovery, which varies
depending on whether the government or the relator is the
primary prosecuting authority. The Court held that a private
relator has constitutional standing to. bring such an action,
but that the statute does not sufficiently establish Congress'
intent to include the states within the definition of persons
against whom such actions may be brought.'84 Accordingly,
the Court did not have to reach the issue of whether the
279. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co.. 177 F.3d 1083. 1086 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998)
(collecting cases).
280. See Circuit City, 194 F.3d at 1071; Craft, 177 F.3d at 1094.
281. 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000).
282. See 162 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1998).
283. 31 u.s.c. §§ 3729-33 (1994).

284. The majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas and Breyer. Justice Ginsburg, concurring,
read the Court's opinion as leaving open the question of whether states were persons
under the statute when the suit is filed by the United States directly. 120 S. Ct. at
1871 {Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter,
dissented, arguing that the term "person" included states. Id. at 1871 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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Eleventh Amendment barred such actions. The opinion
further protects the states from liability and prevents state
employees from bringing qui tam actions against their
employer when it is engaged in defrauding the federal
government in violation of the False Claims Act, the statute
that gives rise to most qui tam actions. 2 "

IX.

CONCLUSION

The October 1999 Term produced five employment law
cases, compared to six in the October 1997 Term and eight in
the October 1998 Term. The five 1999 Term cases impacted
employment law doctrine in significant ways and revealed,
beneath the surface, the traditional voting patterns of the
three groups of Justices on the Court.
Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas continued to vote
against employee interests unless constrained by precedent
or clear statutory language. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Souter, and Stevens continued to vote in a way that protected
the statutory rights of employees, and Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor continued to vote in an unpredictable manner, with
their alignments determining the outcome in some cases.
Reeves is the most important employment law case of the
October 1999 Term. In its substantive part, rejection of
pretext-plus doctrine was a victory for employment law
plaintiffs. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined a majority opinion that clarified Justice
Scalia's opinion for the Court in Hicks. In Hicks, the 5/4
decision of the Court made the task of employment law
plaintiffs more difficult after a prtma facie case has been
established and pretext has been proven. However, the
pretext-plus doctrine later developed by some lower courts
contradicted crucial language in Justice Scalia's opinion. The
procedural aspects of Reeves, relating to trial court review of
evidence for rulings on Rule 50 Motions for Judgment as a
Matter of Law and Rule 56 Motions for Summary Judgment,
do not reveal the traditional voting patterns of the three
groups of Justices In employment law cases. However, the
procedural aspects of Reeves apply to civil litigation in
285. Id at 1858.
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general, and not just to employment law cases.
On the surface, Kimel focuses on broad issues of
federalism and the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
of states. However, the Court could have viewed the case
differently, as involving the power of Congress under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Commerce
Clause. In enacting the ADEA, and later extending it to the
states, Congress was prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination
in employment, an Equal Protection Clause concern, and the
Court's 1976 decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer provided a basis
for upholding ADEA private actions against states. The 5/4
breakdown in Kimel is telling, with Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas in the
majority, and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens
in dissent.
Christensen required interpretation of the public
employee compensatory time provisions of the FLSA. The
Court's opinion favored state employers over state employees,
and rejected a Labor Department opinion letter that
supported the employees' position.
Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg. and Stevens dissented, and the concurring opinion
of Justice Souter had the apparent objective of limiting the
reach of the majority opinion by Justice Thomas.
On the surface, the Court's unanimous decision in
Pegram v. Herdrich is a defeat for employees because the
Court blocked breach of fiduciary duty actions by employees
against HMOs for mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.
However, Justice Souter's opinion for the Court also protects
employees injured by the medical malpractice of HMOs
because it avoids ERISA preemption of the medical
malpractice actions employees now can bring in state and
federal courts.
The fifth case, Harris Trust, also resulted in a unanimous
decision for the Court, with Justice Thomas writing the
opinion. Unanimity may be explained by ,the fact that the
decision benefits employers and employees by permitting
pension plan fiduciaries, participants and beneficiaries to sue
non-fiduciaries for ERISA violations.
The 1997-1999 Term cases reflect the continuing
importance on the Supreme Court docket of employment law
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cases. There is an overall three year trend that favors
employees. However, prediction of likely results in future
cases requires consideration of the voting patterns, in
employment law cases, of the three clearly identifiable groups
of Justices.

